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Kurt Baier wrote that “moral talk is often rather repugnant. Leveling
moral accusations, expressing moral indignation, passing moral judg-
ment, allotting the blame, administering moral reproof, justifying one-
self, and, above all, moralizing—who can enjoy such talk?”1 When
public moral discourse is at its best, we think that these features (if
they are present at all) are unobjectionable. But we also think that, to
some degree, Baier is right: public moral discourse—that is, talk
intended to bring some matter of moral significance to the public con-
sciousness—sometimes fails to live up to its ideal. Public moral dis-
course can go wrong in many ways. One such way is a phenomenon we
believe to be pervasive: moral grandstanding (hereafter,
“grandstanding”).2 We begin by developing an account of grandstand-
ing. We then show that our account, with support from some standard
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1. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics, abridged ed. (New
York: Random House, 1965), p. 3.
2. We think that there are cases of grandstanding that occur in nonmoral domains.
One might, for example, grandstand about one’s intellect, achievements, or know-how.
We focus our attention here on how grandstanding works in the moral domain.
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theses of social psychology, explains the characteristic ways that grand-
standing is manifested in public moral discourse. We conclude by argu-
ing that there are good reasons to think that moral grandstanding is
typically morally bad and should be avoided.
I. WHAT IS MORAL GRANDSTANDING?
Whatever else is true about the nature of morality, its real-world effica-
cy depends a great deal upon the practice of public moral discourse.
The ability to discuss effectively matters of moral concern with other
people is an indispensable tool both for interpersonal dealing and pro-
moting moral improvement. One might expect to find universal rever-
ence for such an important practice. At minimum, one would expect
people to use the tools of moral talk carefully, so that they remain effec-
tive. But Baier’s complaint about the repugnance of some moral talk
strikes a chord, which suggests that public moral discourse is not living
up to its ideal.
That moral talk sometimes goes wrong should be a matter of serious
concern. When moral talk is repugnant, it may be bad for the practice
of public moral discourse. It may be disrespectful to others to abuse
the practice for the promotion of one’s own interests. And it may speak
ill of the character of the person engaging in repugnant moral talk. In
short, moral talk itself can become a form of bad behavior. This article
examines moral grandstanding, one prominent form of repugnant
moral talk, and considers its moral implications.
For most readers, charges of moral grandstanding are familiar. Espe-
cially in contemporary politics, where healthy public discourse is vital,
accusations of grandstanding are hard to miss. For example, on July 11,
2013, the US Senate opened up debate on new efforts to enact compre-
hensive immigration reform. In anticipation of the public discourse to
follow, the American Immigration Council released a statement the
same day, urging that “evidence, rather than grandstanding and rhetor-
ic, should drive the debate on the Senate floor.”3 And Donald Trump’s
2016 US presidential campaign website included the line “We need real
solutions to address real problems. Not grandstanding or political
3. www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/newsroom/release/senate-floor-debate-
must-maintain-spirit-compromise.
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agendas.”4 We take it, however, that senators and presidential candi-
dates are not the only ones liable to grandstand. Despite its being
almost universally derided, grandstanding is a common occurrence in
public discourse. But what is it?5
Our basic contention is that one grandstands when one makes a
contribution to public moral discourse that aims to convince others
that one is “morally respectable.” By this we mean that grandstanding
is a use of moral talk that attempts to get others to make certain desired
judgments about oneself, namely, that one is worthy of respect or
admiration because one has some particular moral quality—for exam-
ple, an impressive commitment to justice, a highly tuned moral sensi-
bility, or unparalleled powers of empathy. To grandstand is to turn
one’s contribution to public discourse into a vanity project.
In what follows, we give an account of central and distinctive fea-
tures of the paradigmatic cases of grandstanding. Our view is that
grandstanding, even of the moral variety, is a diverse and diffuse social
phenomenon, much like, say, love, blame, forgiveness, complaint, and
apology. And as is the case with these phenomena, we are skeptical
that there is an illuminating and nontrivial set of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions that capture the extension of the concept of grand-
standing. Our diffuse grandstanding behaviors form a constellation,
some of them closer to the center than others. The instances of grand-
standing that make up the center of the constellation are the paradig-
matic ones. We propose, then, to give an account of the paradigmatic
cases by illuminating the features at the core of the phenomenon. Our
account of grandstanding is therefore intended to capture those cases
that persons familiar with the practice would most readily recognize as
cases of grandstanding and would use as a frame of reference to judge
whether a given phenomenon is a case of grandstanding (even if it is of
a nonparadigmatic sort).
4. www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/second-amendment-rights.
5. As best we can tell, the first recorded use of the term grandstand in the sense of
“showing off” is from Michael Kelly’s book on American baseball titled Play Ball: Stories
of the Ball Field (Boston: Emery and Hughes, 1888). The term was used to describe base-
ball players who liked to show off after making an impressive play: “It’s the little things of
this sort which makes [sic] ‘the grand stand player.’ They make impossible catches, and
when they get the ball they roll all over the field.” The idea must have been that such
players were playing to the audience, those in the grandstands.
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We do not claim, therefore, to give a complete analysis of the concept
of grandstanding, or even an exhaustive account of the phenomenon.
Our account of grandstanding is limited in scope: it seeks only to illumi-
nate the kind of grandstanding that occurs in the context of public moral
discourse. We do not intend to draw a sharp distinction between public
and private moral discourse, but roughly speaking, public moral dis-
course involves communication that is intended to bring some moral
matter to public consciousness. This is in contrast to typical private mor-
al discourse, which usually involves communication not intended to be
consumed by larger segments of the moral community.
We claim that the phenomenon of grandstanding is characterized by
two central features. We will take them in turn. The first central feature
is that the grandstander desires that others think of her as being moral-
ly respectable with regard to some matter of moral concern.6 When we
say that the grandstander desires that others think of her as morally
respectable, we mean that she wants others to make a positive moral
assessment of her or the group with which she identifies.
In some cases, a grandstander will want others to think of her simply
as meeting some normative baseline whereas others fail to do so. Sup-
pose that morality requires a certain minimum level of care about
immigrants. Here, the grandstander might simply want to be seen as
merely morally respectable in a world where she thinks that precious
few meet even that minimum threshold. For example, a grandstander
might desire that others come to believe that although virtually no one
cares sufficiently about immigrants, the grandstander (or her group)
does.
Sometimes, however, we judge that someone does not merely meet
a minimum threshold of respectability, but is highly or eminently
respectable—that is, we consider some people worthy of great moral
respect. So there is another sense in which a grandstander may want to
be seen as respectable by meeting a loftier standard. For example, one
might want others to believe that while morality requires a certain level
of concern for immigrants, one’s own (or one’s own group’s) concern
for immigrants far exceeds that threshold. In these cases, one wants
others to think of one as being highly or exceptionally morally
6. We use the term grandstander here and throughout to refer not necessarily to a seri-
al grandstander, but to someone who engages in an instance of grandstanding.
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respectable. Here, one wants to be seen not merely as meeting a nor-
mative baseline. Rather, one wants to be seen as a paragon of morality.
The basic idea, then, is that a grandstander desires that other people
recognize her as morally respectable. For ease of expression, call this
desire the recognition desire.7 The content of the recognition desire
may be something as general as a desire merely to be thought of as
“morally respectable,” broadly construed (though perhaps not under
that exact description). Here, the grandstander simply wants a general
form of admiration or respect for being “on the side of the angels.”
In other cases, the content of the recognition desire might be more
fine-grained. Grandstanders may want to be seen as morally respect-
able in a number of ways. We suggest that she might want herself (or
her group) to be seen as having, among other things, respectable moral
beliefs (for example, about what truly counts as fairness, moral pro-
gress, or having moral integrity), moral sensibilities or emotions (for
example, having a certain level of affective sensitivity to inequality),
moral priorities (for example, caring about justice above all else), or
practical moral judgment (for example, having an exceptional insight
into what morally ought to be done).
By whom does the grandstander want to be recognized as morally
respectable? It depends. In some cases, the grandstander will want
those in her own in-group to think of her as morally respectable. One
might, for example, seek to be recognized by members of one’s in-
group as being on the “right side” of some issue.8 In other cases, how-
ever, the grandstander will want members of an out-group to think of
her as being eminently morally respectable. One might, for example,
want people with whom one disagrees to recognize one’s superior mor-
al judgment and so defer to one in moral discourse. In still other cases,
one’s grandstanding will be directed at a general audience, with no
intention of discriminating—one simply wants one’s audience to be
impressed.
7. On one sense of the term recognize, to recognize that some subject S has property P
implies that S actually is P. But this is not the sense we have in mind. The grandstander is
after social recognition whether she is actually morally respectable or not. She wants to
be seen as having P. The recognition desire requires only that one wants to be thought of
as morally respectable by others.
8. Think of those who simply want others to believe that they, too, are on the “right
side of history.”
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Finally, we note that grandstanding does not require believing that
one has a certain level of moral respectability. Imagine, for example, a
politician who, in his speeches, feigns empathy for the plight of Ameri-
can factory workers because he wants voters to think that no one cares
about them more than he does.
Let us now turn to the second central feature of grandstanding.
When people grandstand, they do so by making some kind of contribu-
tion to public moral discourse: they say or write something, for exam-
ple. Call this contribution the grandstanding expression. The second
central feature is this: when one grandstands, one contributes a grand-
standing expression in order to satisfy the recognition desire. In other
words, one’s grandstanding expressions are attempts to get others to
believe that one is morally respectable.
Our claim here is that the recognition desire plays a motivating role
in paradigmatic cases of grandstanding. Although the recognition
desire may not be the only desire motivating the grandstanding expres-
sion, or even the strongest motivating desire, the recognition desire
does make a significant motivating contribution. That is, the grand-
stander says what she does in large part because she desires that others
think of her as morally respectable. However, our motives for acting are
often mixed. Cases of grandstanding are no different. One might want
for others to be impressed with one’s unparalleled commitment to
workers’ rights and also hope that, after hearing what one has to say,
others will take action to support the labor movement.
So how much motivational force must the recognition desire con-
tribute for one’s contribution to count as grandstanding? We think of
grandstanding as a threshold notion. For a contribution to public moral
discourse to count as grandstanding, the recognition desire must play a
significant enough motivating role. Just how significant? We think that
the desire must be strong enough that if the grandstander were to dis-
cover that no one actually came to think of her as morally respectable
in the relevant way, she would be disappointed.
Given that we are elucidating the central and distinctive features of
the paradigmatic cases, we stress that we do not claim that all cases of
grandstanding must be motivated (to some degree or another) by the
recognition desire. We suspect that there may be cases of a phenome-
non properly called grandstanding in which the grandstander does not
possess the recognition desire at all. We are open to the possibility that
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grandstanding may sometimes spring from other motivational sources.
For example, a person with little experience in public moral discourse
might observe grandstanders in action, conclude that theirs is the ideal
form of moral talk, and begin to mimic grandstanding expressions.
Even though such a novice contributes in good faith, she can engage in
a kind of grandstanding, though perhaps of a nonparadigmatic sort.
Additionally, some behavior we might plausibly describe as grand-
standing may stem from a desire to silence a rival. In such cases, one’s
grandstanding may be intended to undermine the credibility of others.
Even in these cases, though, we suspect that the way grandstanding
often (but not always) functions is to silence a rival by presenting the
speaker as more morally respectable by implicit contrast. Thus, grand-
standing functions as an attempt to silence or discredit other discourse
participants by communicating that their opinions are not worth con-
sidering or engaging because they are held by someone who is not
morally respectable, or much less so. At any rate, we will focus on what
we take to be the clearest cases of grandstanding—cases in which the
grandstander does possess the recognition desire, and this desire plays
a significant role in motivating her contribution to public moral
discourse.
II. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF GRANDSTANDING
In this section, we explore the characteristic ways that grandstanding is
manifested in public moral discourse. As we will explain, grandstand-
ing characteristically manifests itself in several phenomena: (1) piling
on; (2) ramping up; (3) trumping up; (4) excessive emotional displays
or reports; and (5) claims of self-evidence. A good, general account of
the central features of grandstanding should have the resources to
explain why it has these characteristic manifestations. We will show
that the account we provided in Section 1, when conjoined with some
standard theses in social psychology, does so.9
First, grandstanding often manifests itself in acts of piling on: the
reiteration of something that has already been said in order to get in on
the action, and to register one’s inclusion on what one believes to be
9. We are grateful to the editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for helpfully suggesting
this way of framing this section, and from whom we have borrowed some language in
doing so.
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the right side. For example, suppose that numerous discussants have
already expressed their view that a petition should be started to protest
some injustice and that the matter is no longer up for debate. Yet some-
one might add the following:
I want to echo what others have said. This petition is vital to the cause
of justice and I happily and wholeheartedly support it. We need to
show that we are on the right side of history.
Our account explains why grandstanding would be manifested in this
way: if one desires that others think of one as, say, being a member of a
morally respectable group, an obvious strategy for satisfying this desire
is to register one’s view in the public square, even if doing so does not
substantively advance discussion.
One way to understand piling on is as an expression of a widely
studied phenomenon in social psychology—that of social compari-
son: people generally want to perceive themselves favorably and be
perceived favorably by others.10 Writing about the phenomenon of
social comparison as manifested in the context of group deliberation,
Cass Sunstein tells us that once discussants “hear what others
believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant
position.”11 Members of the group, not wanting to be seen as coward-
ly or cautious in relation to other members of the group, will then
register their agreement so as not to be perceived by others less
favorably than those who have already spoken up. Piling on therefore
offers a way of being perceived favorably by others. So grandstanders
can pile on as a way of getting others to see them as members of a
morally respectable group.
10. See, for example, Leon Festinger, “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes,”
Human Relations 7 (1954): 117–40; Charles L. Gruder, “Determinants of Social Comparison
Choices,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 7 (1971): 473–89; Jerry M. Suls and
Richard L. Miller, eds., Social Comparison Processes: Theoretical and Empirical Perspec-
tives (New York: Hemisphere, 1977); G. Goethals and J. M. Darley, “Social Comparison
Theory: An Attributional Approach,” in Suls and Miller, Social Comparison Processes, pp.
259–78; and Arie W. Kruglanski and Ofra Mayseless, “Classic and Current Social Compari-
son Research: Expanding the Perspective,” Psychological Bulletin 108 (1990): 195–208.
11. Cass Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization,” Journal of Political Philosophy 10
(2002): 175–95, at p. 179.
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Grandstanding also manifests itself in what we call ramping up, that
is, making increasingly strong claims about the matter under discus-
sion. Consider the following sort of exchange:
Ann: We can all agree that the senator’s behavior was wrong and that
she should be publicly censured.
Biff: Oh please—if we really cared about justice we should seek her
removal from office. We simply cannot tolerate that sort of behavior
and I will not stand for it.
Cal: As someone who has long fought for social justice, I’m sympa-
thetic to these suggestions, but does anyone know the criminal law
on this issue? I want to suggest that we should pursue criminal
charges. We would all do well to remember that the world is
watching.
Our general account also explains why grandstanding would often
manifest itself in ramping up: if one of the possible motivations for
grandstanding is to show that one is more morally respectable than
others, then we can often expect a sort of moral arms race. Increasingly
strong claims can be used to signal that one is more attuned to matters
of justice and that others simply do not understand or appreciate the
nuance or gravity of the situation.12
As with cases of piling on, psychological research on social compari-
son offers an explanation for why ramping up occurs. We can think of
it this way. People often imagine themselves as occupying a certain
position in comparison to others. For example, one might think that
one is more morally respectable than most. Such a general judgment is
often made before hearing what others say about their own views, how-
ever. Once we do hear what others’ views are, we might need to shift
our own views (or at least our presentation of them) in order to be
12. Though our above example of ramping up utilizes increasingly strong negative sug-
gestions, notice that the ramping up may also trend in increasingly strong positive claims.
One discussant may describe a person’s behavior as “brave and worthy of our
admiration,” whereas another may claim that “this act was not only brave, but the most
courageous and selfless act I have ever witnessed.” Here, too, ramping up can be used to
communicate that one is morally respectable—that one can identify paragons of morality
where others cannot.
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perceived (both by ourselves and by others) as retaining the position
we previously took ourselves to hold.
To see this, recall the above conversation. Biff and Cal might have
considered themselves to be morally respectable in some way about
the matter under discussion. But this was before Ann made her own
moral recommendation public. Once Ann offers her moral diagnosis,
Biff and Cal now must make a move in order to retain their perceived
position within the group. And so, as Sunstein tells us, while the
dynamic behind social comparison “is that most people want to take a
position of a socially preferred sort . . . no one can know what such a
position would be until the positions of others are revealed. Thus indi-
viduals move their judgments in order to preserve their image to others
and their image to themselves.”13 In other words, not only will Biff’s
and Cal’s grandstanding tend to push the group’s views toward one
extreme, Ann herself may end up shifting her own view in order to
maintain the image she wishes to project to the rest of the group.
Relatedly, grandstanding may take the form of what we can call
trumping up: the insistence on the existence of a moral problem where
there is none. If grandstanders are eager to show that they are morally
respectable, they may be too eager to identify as moral problems things
that others have (correctly) taken to be morally unproblematic. Trump-
ing up functions to show that one is morally respectable insofar as one
has, for example, a keener moral sense than others. Whereas some
alleged injustices fall below the moral radar of many, they are not
missed by the vigilant eye of the morally respectable. Our account
explains this manifestation of grandstanding: one may try to show that
one is morally respectable by trying to draw attention to features of the
world that (rightly) seem morally unproblematic to others.
Fourth, grandstanding is often characterized by displays or reports
of excessive outrage or other strong emotions. Where moral outrage
gains purchase, the implicit assumption is that the most outraged per-
son has the greatest moral insight or perhaps the strongest moral con-
viction about the issue under discussion. Empirical work on moral
conviction reveals that emotional displays are often good indicators of
how seriously someone takes a moral issue. For example, consider
Linda Skitka’s well-known work in social psychology on “moral
13. Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization,” p. 179.
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conviction,” “the strong and absolute belief that something is right or
wrong, moral or immoral.”14 Moral convictions are a subset of moral
judgments distinguished by three features: (1) they are taken to be uni-
versal (not just, say, personal preference); (2) they are thought to identi-
fy easily discoverable and fairly obvious facts of the world; and (3) they
are sources of very strong emotional responses that arise when, say,
defending or protecting one’s absolute belief in right or wrong.15 Of par-
ticular note here is Skitka’s finding that “there are strong connections
between having moral convictions about issues and having corre-
spondingly strong emotional reactions to these issues.”16 She found
that stronger emotional reactions to various acts or policies (she stud-
ied, for example, physician-assisted suicide and the Iraq War) correlat-
ed with stronger moral conviction about those acts or policies, and that
this is so even when controlling for variables such as religiosity.17
It seems then that something like a display or report of one’s outrage
about a moral issue can be a reliable signal of the strength of one’s mor-
al conviction about it. If so, such emotional displays could be used stra-
tegically to communicate to others one’s own heightened moral
convictions, relative to other group members. Grandstanders may then
exploit this background assumption and so employ outrage to signal
that they are more affected by moral disorder in the world, or empa-
thize more fully with victims of wrongdoing. Such displays of outrage
may lead others to regard one as more morally insightful or sensitive,
and this is why our account explains why grandstanding so often
involves excessive outrage: to be seen as more morally insightful or
sensitive is one way of being seen as morally respectable.
Finally, the account of grandstanding we have proposed makes
sense of the fact that grandstanders often claim that their views are
self-evidently true: “If you cannot see that this is how we should
respond, then I refuse to engage you any further.” Claims of self-evi-
dence can be used to signal that one’s moral sensibilities are more finely
14. Linda J. Skitka et al., “Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength
or Something More?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88 (2005): 895–917, at p.
896.
15. Ibid.
16. Linda J. Skitka, “The Psychology of Moral Conviction,” Social and Personality Psy-
chology Compass 4 (2010): 267–81, at p. 276.
17. Ibid.
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tuned than those of others, and thus that one is morally respectable.
What is not obvious to others is painfully obvious to the grandstander.
Moreover, any suggestion of moral complexity or expression of doubt,
uncertainty, or disagreement is often declaimed by the grandstander as
revealing a deficiency in either sensitivity to moral concerns or com-
mitment to morality itself.18
III. THE MORALITY OF GRANDSTANDING
We suspect that most people would agree that grandstanding is annoy-
ing. We think that it is also morally problematic. In our view, the vast
majority of moral grandstanding is bad, and, in general, one should not
grandstand. We will adduce some reasons for this view shortly, but we
should make a few preliminary points.
First, we will not argue that grandstanding should never be done. We
are open to the possibility that there are circumstances in which either
an instance of grandstanding possesses no bad-making features or,
even if an instance does have bad-making features, the option of not
grandstanding will be even worse.
Second, we will not claim that people who grandstand are bad peo-
ple in virtue of engaging in grandstanding. We all have flaws that are on
occasion revealed in the public square. Engaging in grandstanding is
not obviously worse than many other flaws, and a propensity to grand-
stand is not indefeasible evidence that someone lacks good character.
Third, although we do believe that grandstanding is typically bad
and should not be done, we are not prescribing any particular social
enforcement mechanisms to deal with it. Presently, our concerns are
the nature of grandstanding and its moral status. It does not follow, at
least in any straightforward way, that people should intervene in public
moral discourse to discourage others from grandstanding, or to blame
them for grandstanding.
Fourth, we distinguish between (a) an objection to the morality of
an individual instance of grandstanding and (b) an objection to the
morality of the more general social practice of grandstanding. For
example, a specific instance of grandstanding may lack a certain
18. Indeed, grandstanders often deny that their views are in need of any defense (or
that were they to give a defense, the implication is that their audience would not be
enlightened enough to understand or appreciate it).
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bad-making feature G even though that specific instance may play an
important causal role in the promotion of a widespread practice of
grandstanding that does have feature G. The converse may also hold:
individual acts of grandstanding may be bad in ways that do not apply
to the more general practice. Some of our criticisms will indict grand-
standing at both of these levels. Other criticisms will be aimed at only
one or the other of these levels. Throughout, we will note the target of
each objection.
Finally, we note that one’s considered views about the morality of
grandstanding will depend in no small part on one’s views about nor-
mative ethics more generally. We try to remain neutral among moral
theories and intend only to raise a number of moral problems with
grandstanding. The considerations we adduce, however, are diverse.
There is, as it were, something here for just about everyone.
Consider, first, the deleterious effects that grandstanding—both
individual instances of it and its general practice—typically has on
public moral discourse. To bring these effects into relief, it is helpful to
compare grandstanding to a similar discursive phenomenon: bullshit-
ting. Harry Frankfurt famously argued that one of the problematic fea-
tures of bullshitting is that it has little to do with the justifying purpose
or primary aim of the more general practice with which it is associated.
Indeed, bullshitting interferes with the efficacy of making assertions
that discussants believe to be true.19 As more people begin bullshitting,
the quality of discourse declines, becomes less trustworthy, and so on.
Although grandstanding need not be a form of bullshitting, it can
similarly interfere with the efficacy of public discourse. To see why,
consider that public moral discourse may do a number of things, but
the core, primary function that justifies the practice is to identify pub-
licly certain moral features of a state of affairs, and sometimes addi-
tionally to explain the evaluation of that state or recommend some
19. Frankfurt includes the following analogous case: “Spit-and-polish and red tape do
not genuinely contribute, it is presumed, to the ‘real’ purposes of military personnel or
government officials, even though they are imposed by agencies or agents that purport to
be conscientiously devoted to the pursuit of those purposes. Thus the ‘unnecessary rou-
tine tasks or ceremonial’ that constitute bull are disconnected from the legitimating
motives of the activity upon which they intrude, just as the things people say in bull ses-
sions are disconnected from their settled beliefs, and as bullshit is disconnected from a
concern with the truth.” Harry G. Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” in The Importance of What We
Care About: Philosophical Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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fitting response. In short, the aim of public moral discourse is to
improve people’s moral beliefs, or to spur moral improvement in the
world. To be sure, individual contributions to public moral discourse
sometimes aim to achieve additional goals. Aiming at some other goal
in addition to improving beliefs and spurring improvement is not nec-
essarily a bad thing. But doing so could be problematic if it would
undermine our ability to fulfill the primary aims of public moral dis-
course. We think that grandstanding does interfere with the primary
function of public moral discourse, and that this is one reason to think
that it—like bullshitting—is morally problematic. Here, we discuss
three bad effects of grandstanding that, in our view, interfere with the
primary function of discourse: increased cynicism, outrage exhaustion,
and group polarization. We will take them in turn.
Grandstanding likely promotes an unhealthy cynicism about moral
discourse. Why? Cynicism, as we use the term here, is a form of skepti-
cism and disillusionment about the sincerity of people’s contributions to
moral discourse.20 Recall that many instances of grandstanding occur
because grandstanders want to be regarded as being on the side of the
angels. However, once observers come to see this as a common motiva-
tion for moral claims, they may naturally begin to think that moral dis-
course is really all about showing that your heart is in the right place.
Grandstanding therefore may play a significant role in breeding
cynicism about moral discourse. While moral discourse may unfold
under the pretense of addressing injustice, many contributions are in
fact intended to get others to believe that one is morally respectable.
Thus, as grandstanding becomes more widespread, it leads to a
devaluation of the social currency of moral talk.21 And even if individ-
ual instances of grandstanding only directly produce a little bit of
cynicism, they may end up indirectly producing a lot more cynicism
20. See, for example, L. M. Andersson, “Employee Cynicism: An Examination Using a
Contract Violation Framework,” Human Relations 49 (1996): 95–418.
21. Aside from its effects on public moral discourse, cynicism may have other bad
effects. There is evidence that it negatively affects workplace environments (P. H. Mirvis
and D. Kanter, “Combatting Cynicism in the Workplace,” National Productivity Review
8 [1989]: 377–94), and it has even been linked to increased risk for dementia (E. Neuvonen
et al., “Late-Life Cynical Distrust, Risk of Incident Dementia, and Mortality in a
Population-Based Cohort,” Neurology 82 [2014]: 2205–12) and heart disease (H. Tindle
et al., “Optimism, Cynical Hostility, and Incident Coronary Heart Disease and Mortality in
the Women’s Health Initiative,” Circulation 120 [2009]: 656–62).
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due to what Kruger and Gilovich call “na€ıve cynicism,” a cognitive
bias that leads us to expect that others are more egocentrically biased
than is actually the case.22 In other words, even if individual instan-
ces themselves produce only a little bit of cynicism, this directly gen-
erated cynicism may prejudice us to be more cynical about public
moral discourse in general, even when no one is grandstanding. The
presence of the general practice of grandstanding therefore becomes
a source of even more cynicism. Indeed, some might accuse us as
authors of being unduly cynical about public discourse. Perhaps this
is so—perhaps we are na€ıvely cynical. But we suspect that this
heightened cynicism is due in part to the existence of a general prac-
tice of grandstanding. Because we know many people engage in it,
this makes it easier to be cynical about moral discourse in general.
But this, of course, is exactly our point.
Another way that grandstanding may devalue public moral dis-
course is through what we call outrage exhaustion. Because grand-
standing so often involves excessive outrage or other overt emotional
displays, we predict that participants in public moral discourse will
often have a more difficult time recognizing when outrage is a reliable
signal of injustice, and will also find it increasingly difficult to muster
outrage when it actually is appropriate. Our concern, therefore, is not
about moral outrage as such—we think that there are plenty of injus-
tices for which moral outrage is wholly fitting. Nor is our concern that
people may disagree about when certain degrees of outrage are fitting.
Rather, the worry is that because grandstanding can involve emotional
displays that are disproportionate to their object, and because grand-
standing often takes the form of ramping up, a public discourse over-
whelmed by grandstanding will be subject to this cheapening effect.
This can happen at the level of individual cases of grandstanding, but it
is especially harmful to discourse when grandstanding is widely
practiced.
Relatedly, because grandstanding often results in what we have
called ramping up and trumping up, it contributes to group polariza-
tion, the phenomenon by which members of a deliberating group tend
22. J. Kruger and T. Gilovich, “‘Na€ıve Cynicism’ in Everyday Theories of Responsibility
Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
76 (1999): 743–53.
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to move toward more extreme viewpoints.23 So, for example, imagine
that after a highly publicized school shooting, a group of people in the
community gathers to consider proposing new gun control measures.
Suppose that most of the group tentatively supports new gun control
measures at the outset. After deliberation, however, the group will tend
to move toward enthusiastic support for those same new laws. This is
group polarization.24
One reason for this, as Sunstein argues, has to do with the phenome-
non of social comparison discussed above: discussants “desire to main-
tain their reputation and their self-conception.”25 And so when it
comes to grandstanding, if members of a group are motivated to outdo
one another with their contributions to public moral discourse, then
their group dynamic will tend to push them to advocate increasingly
extreme views.
This effect not only increases the likelihood that participants advo-
cate false views; it also encourages an impression in persons not asso-
ciated with the group that morality is a nasty business, and that moral
discourse consists primarily of extreme and implausible claims. This
effect, too, can happen at both levels. In a particular discussion, one or
more acts of grandstanding can promote polarization, such as in the
example Sunstein gives. But after repeated iterations of conversations
where grandstanding is introduced across large segments of a popula-
tion, the views (or purported views) of entire groups can become more
polarized.
It should be admitted, however, that despite all these possible nega-
tive effects, individual instances of grandstanding can sometimes bring
about good consequences. Grandstanders may inspire followers and
cause social pressure for reform in cases that might otherwise have
escaped public attention. The statements of grandstanders might serve
as effective coordination points when groups are otherwise unable to
reach consensus. And the grandstanding lead singer of an activist punk
rock band might move a listless seventeen-year-old to “check out” the
23. See, for example, Johannes A. Zuber et al., “Choice Shift and Group Polarization:
An Analysis of the Status of Arguments and Social Decision Schemes,” Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 62 (1992): 50–61.
24. We borrow this example from Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization,” pp. 175–
76.
25. Ibid., p. 176.
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presidential campaign of Ralph Nader, and thereby indirectly lead him
to a lifetime of engagement with moral and political philosophy. These
and any number of other good things might happen because of grand-
standing. But even when grandstanding promotes the good, it may still
contribute the negative effects we have described. Moreover, its effec-
tiveness in bringing about these positive results does not go unnoticed
by those who would use it for ill. And so even if there are cases of
grandstanding with good results, this may encourage others to grand-
stand in ways that promote bad results.
Concerns about the effects of grandstanding aside, there is also good
reason to think that grandstanding is usually disrespectful to those one
addresses when one grandstands. Public moral discourse is a practice
that can work more or less well. The degree to which it is effective
depends on whether participants conform to rules—explicit or other-
wise—that promote the ends of the practice, whatever the advantages
of individual defection. Suppose, then, that grandstanding generally
succeeds in conferring upon the grandstander some public recognition
of her putative moral respectability. If this is so, then grandstanding
can be understood as a form of free riding on the more general practice
of public moral discourse: the grandstander gains whatever benefits
are generated by participants in public moral discourse who do not
grandstand, while also accruing the additional benefit of public recog-
nition for herself. The grandstander benefits from the cooperation of
others without accepting the costs of cooperation for herself. She acts
as if she regards herself as above the rules that constrain everyone else’s
behavior, and so disrespects them.
Put differently, the primary aim of public moral discourse is to pro-
mote improvement in people’s moral beliefs and behavior. The grand-
stander engages in behavior that would undermine the primary aim of
the practice she exploits for her own benefit if the same privileges she
claims for herself were extended to everyone. If grandstanding became
the dominant form of public moral discourse, then public moral dis-
course would likely cease to be effective at promoting its primary aim.
At best, it would instead merely promote awareness of participants’
moral respectability. Furthermore, there is good reason to hold that
even single instances of grandstanding—which individually have prac-
tically no effect on the efficacy of public moral discourse more general-
ly—are morally problematic. For if we are right that grandstanding is
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often a form of free riding and free riding is typically disrespectful of
those with whom we interact, then individual instances of grandstand-
ing are also typically disrespectful.
We think it worth noting that this concern yields a reason in favor of
talking about the phenomenon of grandstanding: when enough people
in a discussion know about grandstanding, it becomes less personally
beneficial to grandstand, and so grandstanding will be disincentivized.
It will cease to serve as an effective means of satisfying the recognition
desire, as participants in public moral discourse will be less likely to
give the grandstander the social recognition that she seeks.
Individual instances of grandstanding can also be disrespectful in a
different way. When grandstanders aim to show that they are morally
respectable, they sometimes implicitly claim an exalted status for
themselves as superior judges of the content of morality and its proper
application. Grandstanding can thus be a kind of “power grab.” For
instance, one might employ grandstanding in order to seek greater sta-
tus within an in-group as a kind of moral sage. Alternatively, grand-
standers sometimes dismiss the dissenting claims of others as being
beneath the attention of the morally respectable. This is an objection-
able way of dealing with one’s peers in public moral discourse because
in general we ought to regard one another as just that—peers. We
should speak to each other as if we are on relatively equal footing, and
act as if moral questions can only be decided by the quality of reason-
ing presented rather than the identity of the presenter himself. But
grandstanders seem sometimes to deny this, and in so doing disrespect
their peers.
It might be objected that it is common in public moral discourse to
call for deference from others in light of, say, one’s specialized experi-
ence that confers a superior moral insight that others lack. In the public
outcry over the Bowe Bergdahl case, for instance, in which five mem-
bers of the Taliban detained by the United States were freed in
exchange for the release of a single American soldier, some members of
the military community defended the general practice of prisoner
exchange by invoking their experience. They could understand better
than civilians, they said, why the practice is defensible and morally
important.
Let us grant the premise that the military community was correct—
they do have a deeper insight into the worth of the practice than do
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civilians—and that everyone would have more accurate beliefs by
deferring to the voice of experience. We recognize that there may be
forms of moral knowledge that some can gain only by accepting the
testimony of others, and so there may be such a thing as moral exper-
tise.26 But we also think that this notion is widely abused in public mor-
al discourse. People too often break off discussion by saying that those
who disagree with them could not possibly be made to understand
while leaving untapped argumentative resources for helping them
understand—or, indeed, failing to consider that they themselves might
be mistaken. In these cases, we think it clear that it would be better if,
rather than invoking their purported respectable moral status and tell-
ing their peers that they simply could not understand, those with great-
er moral insight offered reasons accessible to all. So even though
claims of moral expertise may sometimes be epistemically warranted,
adverting to one’s moral expertise in public discourse as a way to
change minds or spur moral improvement may still be a deficient form
of address.
Finally, we think that the incongruity between the subject matter of
public moral discourse and the behavior and motivation of grand-
standers often justifies a negative aretaic judgment. Individual acts of
grandstanding are typically self-promoting, and so grandstanding can
reveal a narcissistic or egoistic self-absorption.27 Public moral dis-
course involves talking about serious and important issues: the evalua-
tion of conditions that greatly affect the well-being of millions of
people, the leveling of accusations that could ruin lives, the consider-
ation of a policy that could save or ruin a state and its subjects, and so
on. These are matters that generally call for other-directed concern,
and yet grandstanders find a way to make discussion at least partly
about themselves. In using public moral discourse to promote an
image of themselves to others, grandstanders turn their contributions
26. For a helpful discussion, see Karen Jones, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,” Jour-
nal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 55–78.
27. Grandstanding can be narcissistic even when it is uncharacteristic for a person
and so does not display a defect of character. As we will argue below, we think that grand-
standing is typically not something that a virtuous person would engage in. If that is cor-
rect, then even occasional acts of grandstanding can open one up to certain kinds of
negative aretaic judgments, such as the criticism that one is acting ostentatiously or nar-
cissistically, even if one does not have the corresponding negative character traits. We
thank the editors of Philosophy& Public Affairs for raising this point.
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to moral discourse into a vanity project. Consider the incongruity
between, say, the moral gravity of a world-historic injustice, on the one
hand, and a group of acquaintances competing for the position of
being most morally offended by it, on the other.
Such behavior, we think, is not the sort of thing we should expect
from a virtuous person. According to many virtue theories (and many
other ethical theories, besides), what determines the moral quality of
an act is not simply the nature of your action, but also your motivation
for so acting.28 As we understand grandstanding, the grandstander’s
motivation is largely egoistic; she is using public moral discourse to
secure certain kinds of recognition for herself. The virtuous person’s
motivation for engaging in public moral discourse, however, would not
be largely egoistic; the virtuous person would not typically be motivat-
ed to seek out recognition, approval, or praise for her putative moral
virtue. But what kinds of reasons would typically motivate the virtuous
in their contributions to public moral discourse?
We do not need to take a stand, but we suggest two possible moti-
vations. First, the virtuous person might be motivated for other-
directed reasons: she wants to help others think more carefully about
the relevant issues, or she wants to give arguments and reasons in
order to challenge others’ thinking in a way that promotes under-
standing. Second, the virtuous person might be motivated for princi-
pled reasons: she simply cares about having true moral beliefs and
acting virtuously, and so wants others to believe what is true about
morality and act for the right moral reasons. All we claim here is that
the virtuous person’s motivation, unlike the grandstander’s, is not
largely egoistic.29
To conclude, then, we think that for a number of reasons, moral
grandstanding—both in its individual manifestations and as a general
social practice—is typically morally bad and ought not to be done. We
take ourselves to have established a strong moral presumption against
grandstanding.
28. See, for example, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (India-
napolis: Hackett, 1985), 1105a31–32.
29. We thank Christian Miller for discussion about the motivations that virtuous per-
sons might have when engaging in public discourse.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We have suggested that moral grandstanding is a pervasive feature of
public moral discourse. And we have argued that, for a variety of rea-
sons, grandstanding is also morally problematic. Yet we remain opti-
mistic about the prospects for a healthy and robust public moral
discourse. One reason for optimism is that we reject the view that it is
inevitable that as long as there is public moral discourse, grandstand-
ing will be common. It might be tempting to take this dim view—to be
resigned to the rather depressing thought that moral talk just is, as
Baier put it, rather repugnant. But there is nothing about our practice
of moral talk or the purposes to which it is admirably put that demands
that interlocutors seek recognition for their purported morally respect-
able status. While it may be true that humans have deep needs for rec-
ognition, it is not inevitable that they will seek it in every context,
especially when they see that there are many contexts in which doing
so would be inappropriate. And just as people need not seek recogni-
tion through grandstanding, others need not reward grandstanders
with the recognition they seek. Once we reflect on grandstanding, its
moral status, and the justifying aims of public discourse, we may be
less inclined to grandstand, and less impressed by the grandstanding of
others.
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